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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
-----------------------------------x 
EARL STEVENS, 
Plaintiff, 
FILED· 
l 7-cv-8603 (JSR) 
-v-
VODKA & MILK, LLC; VODKA & MILK 2, 
LLC; BUCK 50 PRODUCTIONS; and 
ERIKA KANE 
Defendants. 
-----------------------------------x 
--'-"i 
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J. 
ORDER 
Plaintiff and counterclaim-defendant Earl Stevens 
originally brought this action against author Erica Kane and 
publishers Vodka & Milk, LLC; Vodka & Milk 2, LLC; and Buck 50 
Productions, making various claims that stem from defendants' 
2017 publication of a book - Captain Save a Hoe - that is also 
the title of a song that Stevens released in 1993. All 
defendants responded with the same set of counterclaims, 
including intentional interference with a contract under New 
York law. 1 Stevens moves to dismiss that counterclaim. For the 
reasons that follow, that motion is granted and the first 
counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice. 
: This motion was filed before Erica Kane (apparently a nom de 
plume) was served. She makes the exact same counterclaim based 
on the exact same allegations as the corporate defendants. By 
agreement of the parties, plaintiff's motion incorporates Kane's 
counterclaim, and Kane adopts the corporate defendants' 
arguments in opposition. 
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The elements of a claim of tortious interference with a 
contract under New York law are "(l) the existence of a valid 
contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the 
defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) the defendant's 
intentional procurement of the third-party's breach of the 
contract without justification; (4) actual breach of the 
contract; and (5) damages resulting therefrom." Kirch v. Liberty 
Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 401 (2d Cir. 2006) 2 ; see also 
Hornstein v. Podwitz, 173 N.E. 674, 675 (N.Y. 1930). 
Counterclaimants allege that Stevens contacted various 
online retailers and asked that they stop selling 
counterclaimants' book, but knew or should have known that the 
book did not infringe on Stevens's copyright. They also allege 
that Stevens knew or should have known that his interference 
would cause these retailers to stop selling the book and thus 
breach their contracts with counterclaimants, that this in fact 
occurred, and that counterclaimants suffered injuries therefrom. 
See ECF Nos. 31, 32, 39 ~~ 14, 17-20. 
Stevens makes several arguments in favor of dismissal, only 
one of which the Court need address: that this counterclaim is 
preempted by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). 
2 In quoting cases, this order omits internal citations, 
footnotes, alterations in the originals, and internal quotation 
marks, unless otherwise noted. 
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Section 512 of the DMCA limits liability for copyright 
infringement by creating safe harbors for internet service 
providers that follow certain detailed procedures. One such safe 
harbor is found in Section 512(c), which uinsulates service 
providers from liability for infringements of which they are 
unaware, contained in material posted to their sites by users, 
so as to make it commercially feasible for them to provide 
valuable Internet services to the public." Capitol Records, LLC 
v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2016). This section also 
"augments the rights of copyright owners by establishing a 
notice-and-takedown regime." Id. at 83. Through that process, 
those who believe an internet service provider is hosting 
material that infringes on their copyright can submit a formal 
takedown notice, and the provider loses the benefit of the safe 
harbor if it continues to host the allegedly infringing 
material. see 17 u.s.c. § 512 (c) (1) (C). It is undisputed that 
the notices Stevens sent to online retailers were takedown 
notices pursuant to this Section of the DMCA. 
The DMCA also provides two remedies for posters who believe 
their material has been taken down incorrectly. Section 512(g) 
requires providers to take "reasonable steps promptly to notify" 
the poster whose content has been removed. Id. § 512(g) (2) (A). 
The alleged infringer can then send the provider a "counter 
notification," including a statement of good-faith belief that 
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the material was removed "as a result of mistake or 
misidentification.'' Id. § 512 (g) (3) (C). Providers must then 
"promptly" inform the person that sent the initial notification 
that they will replace the removed material in 10 business days. 
Id. § 512 (g) (2) (B). After those 10 business days have passed 
- but before 14, and absent a lawsuit seeking restraint of the 
allegedly infringing activity - the provider must put the 
material back online. Id. at§ 512(g) (2). 
Congress also created the following private cause of action 
as a remedy for abuse of this notice-and-takedown system: 
Any person who knowingly materially 
misrepresents that material or activity 
is infringing . shall be liable for any 
damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, 
incurred by the alleged infringer . . . who is 
injured by such misrepresentation, as the 
result of the service provider relying upon 
such misrepresentation in removing or 
disabling access to the material or activity 
claimed to be infringing . . . . 
Id. § 512 (f). 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, federal law 
"shall be the supreme Law of the Land," U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 
2, meaning that when state laws threaten the supremacy of 
federal law, they are "preempted" and must give way. Relevant 
here is "field preemption," which occurs "where Congress has 
legislated so comprehensively that federal law occupies an 
entire field of regulation and leaves no room for state law." 
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Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 2005). 
"Where Congress occupies an entire field, even 
complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field 
preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any 
state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal 
standards." Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012). 
Several other courts have held that the remedial provisions 
of the DMCA preempt state intentional interference with contract 
claims based on the wrongful use of DMCA takedown notices. See 
Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1205 
(N.D. Cal. 2004) ("In section 512(f), Congress provides an 
express remedy for misuse of the DMCA's safe harbor provisions. 
It appears that Congress carefully balanced the competing 
interests of copyright holders, ISPs, and the public, by 
providing immunity subject to relief for any misuse of the 
statute."); Amaretto Ranch Breedables, LLC v. Ozimals, Inc., No. 
C 10-05696, 2011 WL 2690437, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) 
("[A] DMCA Takedown Notification is a creature of a federal 
statutory regime, and . that regime preempts any state law 
claim based on an allegedly improper DMCA Takedown 
Notification."); Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-03783, 
2008 WL 962102, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2008). This Court 
agrees. 
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DMCA takedown notices, and the system of which they are a 
part, are creations entirely of federal law. The DMCA is a 
complex and comprehensive statutory regime that meticulously 
details the steps that providers must take to avoid liability 
and that copyright holders must take to enforce their rights. 
Congress also included express remedies for alleged infringers 
by providing for a counter-notice system and a cause of action 
if fraudulent use of the notice and takedown procedures causes 
injury. Contrast Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 
250-51 (1984) (permitting state tort remedies for violations of 
federal law in an otherwise preempted field, relying on the 
absence of a federal remedy) . With this detailed process and 
these two express remedies, Congress intended to "appropriately 
balance[] the interests of content owners, on-line and other 
service providers, and information users in a way that will 
foster the continued development of electronic commerce and the 
growth of the Internet." H.R. REP. 105-551(11) at 21 (1998). The 
pervasive nature of the DMCA, including an express remedy for 
the very wrong that counterclaimants here allege, "make[s] 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement" the remedies outlined in the DMCA. Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
Moreover, copyright law has been overwhelmingly controlled 
by Congress since the Copyright Act of 1976. Indeed, though it 
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does not apply here, the Copyright Act has contained a provision 
expressly preempting almost all state law claims sounding in 
copyright since October 27, 1998 (the day before the DMCA was 
passed). See 17 U.S.C. § 30l(a). Federal law's near-total 
occupation of the field of copyright law further supports an 
inference that the federal interest in creating remedies to 
ensure compliance with the DMCA "is so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on 
the same subject." Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.3 
The Court holds that defendants' counterclaim for 
intentional interference with contract is preempted by the DMCA. 
Amendment of the counterclaim would therefore be futile. 
Accordingly, that counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice. 
SO ORDERED 
Dated: New York, NY 
March £.l, 2018 ~~'* U.S.D.J. 
3 "There is typically a presumption against preemption in areas 
of regulation that are traditionally allocated to states and are 
of particular local concern. The presumption against federal 
preemption disappears, however, in fields of regulation that 
have been substantially occupied by federal authority for an 
extended period of time." Wachovia, 414 F.3d at 314. 
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